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Abstract 
Revenue management systems (RM) dynamically update product prices in order to optimize for 
revenue. When such systems are used by the companies participating in a market, the RM 
operational outcome is manifested in volatile market prices. In this paper, we assess the use of a 
market’s price-volatility level as a possible tool to evaluate market performance. In the airline 
industry, the degree of price volatility varies dramatically across different markets. We quantify 
the relationship between these volatility levels and various route-level performance metrics: 
transacted fares, sales (fill rate) and revenue. Using data on US domestic aviation markets, we find 
that markets with higher levels of price volatility are associated with higher levels of transacted 
fares, lower aircrafts’ fill rates, higher revenues, and higher degrees of transacted fare dispersion.  
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Revenue Management (RM) systems support sellers in maximizing their revenue under the inherit trade-
off conditions they face. Namely, sellers strive to sell their products to those customers who value them 
highly, so that high margins can be achieved. However, if the sellers wait too long for those high valuation 
customers to appear, they might end up with unsold units that could have been sold to customers with lower 
valuations. This trade-off emerges in numerous industries. For example, in the travel industry, business 
passengers tend to finalize their travel plans closer to the travel date, and leisure passengers make their 
travel arrangements well in advance. Revenue optimization under such variations in demand characteristics 
is under the scope of RM systems.  
In the airline industry, fare classes are the mechanism underlying RM practices. Fare classes are 
designed to target different consumer segments based on consumers’ characteristics, such as valuations, 
time and price sensitivity. The prices of these fare classes are often determined well in advance, and in real-
time RM systems dynamically control the availability of the different fare classes, based, among others, on 
the realization of demand, time to departure, and updated demand forecasts. With the rapid development of 
information technologies and the growth of e-commerce, RM systems incorporate a greater level of 
sophistication and velocity, which, coupled with the lower costs associated with these fare-related 
adjustments (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000), can translate into frequent updates to the availability of fare 
classes.  
The mere use of RM does not mandate a uniform degree of price volatility levels across markets. As 
we show in this research, the reality is quite the opposite: different markets exhibit significantly different 
price volatility levels. These differences in price volatility essentially suggest that the RM and pricing 
decisions commanded by RM systems vary, quite dramatically, across markets. The research question 
guiding this work is to what extent do these differences in price volatility embody new information from 
which decision makers can infer about market performance variables, and to what extent can these 
differences be explained by conventional market characteristics? Understanding the relationship between 
price volatility and market performance measures can potentially help assess market efficiencies and 




competitive environments. This can guide both carriers, when assessing their operations in different 
markets, and consumers as they try to behave strategically in timing their ticket purchase.  
We examine the relationship between market price volatility and several commonly used 
performance measures in the airline industry: average transacted fare normalized for the distance (referred 
to as yield, or Revenue per Passenger Kilometer, or RPK); the dispersion of the transacted fares as measured 
by the Gini coefficient; fill rate, which captures the proportion of seats sold on flights (also referred to as 
load factor); as well as a measurement of the average revenue generated from each seat on the plane per 
unit of distance, which is the product of yield and load factor. This measure is also known as Revenue per 
Available Seat Kilometer, or RASK.  
We also seek evidence for the role of volatility in affecting consumer behavior. The marketing 
literature has shown in the context of staple goods that price volatility may impact consumers’ price 
valuation (and reference price) of the product. When purchasing staple goods, consumers generally become 
less sensitive to prices (Volkmann, 1951; Janiszewski and Lichtenstein, 1999) and less certain about the 
reference price (Winer, 1989). Consequently, they may be willing to accept a larger range of prices 
(Dickson and Sawyer, 1990; Winer 1986; Rao and Sieben, 1992; Kalyanaram and Little,1994). If similar 
consumer behavior effects exist in the context of RM goods, carriers may be able to generate more revenue 
as an outcome of volatility.  
Using a database consisting of posted fares in several hundred US domestic routes we quantify the 
magnitude of price volatility in the various markets. First, we find that a higher level of price volatility is 
associated with a larger Gini coefficient of transacted fares. While this relationship between volatility of 
posted prices and dispersion of transaction prices may not be surprising, this result is interesting as the 
relationship between variations of posted prices and dispersion of transacted prices was not established 
previously in the context of airfares. We also find that, after controlling for market and competition 
characteristics, higher levels of price volatility in a market are associated with higher transacted fares for 
each kilometer flown. With respect to fill rates, we find that they are significantly lower in markets with 
more volatile fares. As we witness higher average transacted fares but lower fill rates, the ultimate question 




arises: Are volatile markets associated with higher revenue rates? Our empirical estimation reveals that 
airlines’ revenues rates are higher in the markets exhibiting more price volatility. That is, the higher 
transacted fares associated with higher fare volatility compensate for the reduced fill rates. By applying a 
two-stage model, estimating market fare volatility and posted prices in the first stage and revenue in the 
second, we find evidence that price sensitive consumers behave differently in volatile markets, enabling 
carriers to generate increased revenues. While price volatility does not induce revenue in business markets, 
in leisure markets it may help derive higher revenues.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature on sources 
of price volatility. In Section 3 we consider the implications of price volatility with an emphasis on the 
airline industry. Section 4 introduces the data used for the empirical analysis. The main empirical 
estimations are carried out in Section 5, whereas Section 6 addresses issues relating to consumer behavior. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2 Revenue Management and sources of price volatility 
The classic RM setting (Netessine and Shumsky, 2002) considers a seller who (i) is endowed with a limited 
inventory of a perishable good; (ii) commits to sales while facing uncertainty about future demand; (iii) 
faces different distinguishable demand segments, enabling separate fare rules and restrictions; (iv) can sell 
the same unit of inventory to any demand segment; and (v) seeks to maximize profit. The emerging revenue 
maximizing solution is such that the seller designs fare classes that correspond to the different demand 
segments, and these fare classes are opened and closed over time in response to the changing demand 
(Belobaba, 1989). A rich literature on revenue management has emerged from this revenue maximization 
problem, see, e.g., reviews by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) Phillips (2005) and Bodea and Ferguson (2014). 
An important outcome of revenue management methods, is the fluctuation of prices as fare classes 
are reopened or reclosed (MaAfee and te Velde, 2007; Anderson and Wilson 2003). This is important since 
the level of fluctuation informs us on the dynamics in the market. It is possible that merely from observing 
fluctuation levels, one may be able to assess market performance. Fluctuating prices may also affect 
consumers purchasing behavior. While volatile prices are common in revenue managed goods, consumers’ 




response to fluctuating prices of revenue managed goods has mostly been ignored. Revenue management 
practices may have similar effects to those modeled under the context of mixed price strategies, which we 
describe next.  
Mixed pricing is commonly used by firms to discriminate between a heterogeneous pool of consumers, 
typically informed and uninformed, to establish market segmentation. Various models have shown that 
mixed pricing strategies would be adopted in equilibrium and thus give rise to volatile prices, both in 
monopolistic and competitive environments. For example, in Varian’s (1980) seminal model it is optimal 
for the stores to randomize their prices in order to price discriminate between informed and uniformed 
consumers. In a related model, Baye and Morgan (2001) develop a theory of information gate-keepers (e.g., 
an Internet platform), who charge sellers as well as buyers access fees. In equilibrium, the firms that join 
the gate-keepers (and advertise) adopt a mixed pricing strategy. Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) show the 
persistence of mixed pricing strategies when retailers also compete in their price frames (such as presenting 
the price in terms of weight vs volume). In their model, the randomization of price frames is utilized to 
obfuscate price comparisons. 
Extending the concept of market segmentation and mixed pricing with the notion of loyal consumers, 
garnered an ongoing attention to the relationship between firms’ intertemporal pricing strategies, and their 
price promotion strategies (e.g., Raju et al., 1990). Narasimhan (1988) studies the depth and frequency of 
discounts in a model with loyal consumers and brand switchers. Sinitsyn (2008) shows that mixed pricing 
over a fixed number of prices persists in the presence of heterogeneous loyal consumers in the market. 
Sinitsyn (2012) studies promotions considering two firms, each selling two complementary products. Bell 
et al. (1999) provide evidence on the efficacy of price promotions, by decomposing the total price elasticity 
for 173 brands. They find that price promotions result with demand expansion (25%) and secondary demand 
effects or brand switching (75%). Abby et al. (2015) show that increasing prices may also be beneficial 
when a new manufactured product enter a market.  
Price promotions are also used when firms do not apply a clear mixed pricing strategy. For example, 
promotions are used as a tool to discriminate between stockpilers and non-stockpilers, between heavy and 




light users, or between consumers with heavy vs. low cost of time. Price promotions may induce consumers 
to adopt a behavior where they stockpile goods when prices are low (Helsen and Schmittlein, 1992; 
Assunção and Meyer, 1993).  
3 Behavioral implications of price changes 
The extant literature that establishes the behavioral relationship between fluctuating posted prices and 
transacted prices has relied primarily on analysis of staple goods such as peanut butter (Murthi et al., 2007), 
coffee (Han et al., 2001) and sweetened and unsweetened drinks (Kalyanaram and Little, 1994). Range 
Theory suggests that as consumers are exposed to price fluctuations, they become less sensitive to changes 
in prices (Volkmann, 1951). A series of experiments by Janiszewski and Lichtenstein (1999) have provided 
support to this theory and further suggested that consumers’ perception of prices could be altered by 
manipulating the evoked price range. Additionally, as prices are perceived to follow some random process, 
consumers’ become uncertain about prices (Winer, 1989, Mellers 1980), which can further increase the 
range of prices that consumer consider as acceptable (Dickson and Sawyer, 1990; Winer, 1986).  
A major factor influencing consumer behavior in the process of price changes is consumers’ 
reference price. Reference price refers to consumers’ perception of what is the “right” price for the good. 
The reference price can be an aggregation of external reference prices (i.e., what are the prices of 
comparable goods) and the internal reference price (i.e., internally established by the consumer). The 
creation of the latter may follow Helson’s (1964) Adaptation-Level Theory, according to which it is the 
accumulation of current pervious elated stimuli (including their magnitude, range, as well as dispersion). 
Price volatility of staple goods has been shown to increase the reference price of consumers (Krishna and 
Johar, 1996). As the reference price increases, it could affect the perceived gains and losses. Similarly, price 
volatility has been shown to affect the range of price acceptance (Rao and Sieben, 1992; Kalyanaram and 
Little, 1994), and that “higher own-price volatility makes consumers more sensitive to gains and less 
sensitive to losses” (Han et al., 2001). Adding to this finding, Murthi et al. (2007) show that price variability 
can mitigate the price sensitivity of price-sensitive consumers. Effectively, they argue that “price volatility 
affects price sensitivity by increasing the level and range of reference prices, by lowering the importance 




weight that a customer places on price, and by affecting the perception of the difference between the actual 
price and the reference price.”  
As mentioned earlier, the studies thus far focus primarily on staple goods, whereas our interest in 
perishable goods that are dynamically priced, such as airfares. This is an important difference, as for staple 
goods consumers may have the capacity to stockpile goods and decide rationally when to purchase the 
goods (Sterman and Dogan, 2015; Assunção and Meyer, 1993), and thus may exhibit strategic behavior. 
Furthermore, such behavior is significantly more challenging in the context of revenue managed goods. As 
part of this research, we show a possible correspondence between the staple goods literature and revenue 
managed goods.    
4 Data 
Our analysis of the relationship between price volatility and transacted fares, sales and revenue in the airline 
industry is based on data from two primary sources: an online fare aggregator1, to collect data on daily 
posted fare, and the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) databases, to gather data on transacted 
prices, supply of seats, and sales.  
From the aggregator website, we extracted the lowest available fare histories for 823 airport pairs. 
Five departure dates, one week apart from one another, were sampled, providing 5 fare histories for 
departures in the first quarter of 2008: February 26, March 4, 11, 18, and 25. We illustrate the range of 
variation of daily posted fare data in different markets in Figure 1. This figure shows two distinct types of 
markets. The right panel depicts a sample of airport pairs with very low fare variation over time. The only 
significant price movement in those markets is observed roughly two weeks before the flight takes place 
(which is in line with the intertemporal price discrimination between leisure and business travelers 
mentioned earlier). The left panel, on the other hand, depicts fare histories in markets that are more volatile. 
It is evident that the fare fluctuations are not limited to a certain time frame, and that in those markets the 
                                                            
1 Specifically, we have collected fare data from Farecast, a website that by data-mining past fare histories, provided 
statistical inference about future movements of the lowest available fare as described in Etzioni et al. (2003). Following 
its sale to Microsoft in 2008, it was integrated into the Bing’s platform.  




fares change quite frequently, and in considerable magnitude. Obviously, these differences in volatility 
capture information on the realization of RM practices in different markets. The question that emerges is 
whether these differences in price volatility levels embed information over and above the conventional 
variables such as competition, population, and other market characteristics. More specifically, we ask 
whether volatility levels help us learn more on transacted prices dispersion (as opposed to posted prices), 
fill rates, and revenues. Further, we seek initial evidence to whether those price fluctuations may have 
behavioral consequences on price sensitive consumers.  
 
   
Figure 1. Sample of lowest available fare histories for airport pairs for 7-day return flights departing on 
March 4, 2008. Left panel highly volatile airfares, Right panel: highly stable pattern. 
 
It should be noted that the observed pricing realization is relatively persistent in each market. To 
demonstrate, consider the CVG-LGA and the DCA-MDW markets. The former is a relatively volatile 
market, while the latter is a relatively stable market. In Figure 2 we demonstrate the behavior of five fare 
histories for each of these two markets. It is clear that the volatility level of each market is persistent across 
its five fare histories. It is evident that in the CVG-LGA market, depicted in the left pane of Figure 2, the 
price is rather unstable. By contrast, in the DCA-MDW market, the five fare histories show minimal 




























Figure 2. Different fare histories: CVG-LGA (left panel) and DCA-MDW (right panel) 
 
From the DOT we gathered transacted fare data from the Origin and Destination Survey database 
(DB1B) which is a 10% sample of transacted airline tickets provided by reporting carriers on a quarterly 
basis. Other variables, such as scheduled and performed flights, seating capacity, and load factors were 
derived from the DOT’s T-100 database.2  
4.1 Measuring price volatility 
Our fare volatility measure is based on the common instruments used in the marketing literature, which also 
help capture possible perceptions of volatility by consumers. Namely, we refer to the measure devised and 
used by Kalyanaram and Little (1994), Han et al. (2002), and Murthi et al. (2007), while normalizing for 
potential differences in market price levels, as was done by Mantin and Gillen (2011), with the following 
formulation3: 
                                                            
2 There is a considerable body of literature that relies on the DB1B. Such research is typically concerned with the 
relationship between market structure and transacted airfares to derive appropriate public policies. Of interest in our 
context, however, are the studies on price levels and dispersion. Works such as Borenstein and Rose (1994), Hayes 
and Ross (1998), Dai et al. (2014), and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), are primarily interested in the effect of competition 
on price dispersion. This stream of literature abstracts away from the intertemporal behavior of posted airfares. Several 
works have studied posted prices, such as the early work by Stavins (2001), and more recent contributions that use 
online sources (such as MaAfee and te Velde, 2007; and Gillen and Hazeldine, 2006). While previous studies have 
typically related to either posted prices or transacted prices, we relate to both and examine the link between posted 
and transacted airfares. 
3 In the marketing literature, a simple price volatility measure can be used as prices of goods from the same category 
are compared. Such an exponential smoothing method is preferred over other measures as “it captures the price 























































, with 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚ℎ90 = 0, 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is the price volatility of market m in fare history h at t days prior to the flight and 𝜃𝜃 is the 
smoothing constant that can take any value between 0 and 1. We considered several values of  𝜃𝜃 . 
Qualitatively, the results are similar and herein we present only the results for the case of 𝜃𝜃 = 0 as it 
captures the full magnitude of price changes.4 
Since our objective is to obtain market volatility levels, we calculated the vector of price volatilities 
on a market from 𝑡𝑡 = 90 days out to = 1 , for each of the five fare histories collected. We then averaged 
the results for each fare history, yielding five measures of volatility, one for each fare history. These five 
measures where averaged for each market, which resulted in one volatility measure per market. Our 
measure PVOLN90 captures the entire fare history (from 90 days out until 1 day out) on the route and is 







In the appendix, we explore an alternative measurement of price volatility which is based on the degree of 
price predictability.  
4.2 Market Performance Variables 
We estimate the relationship of several market level performance variables and fare volatility. The first 
measure captures the average transacted prices in each market. Specifically, AveragePaidFareKM 
considers the average price paid by passengers on non-stop flights for an itinerary on a route divided by the 
direct distance (measured in kilometers). This metric is also known as yield, or the revenue per passenger 
kilometer, and was calculated based on averages of transactions in the Origin and Destination Survey 
sample (DB1B). As the DB1B includes transactions made under loyalty programs and other special 
benefits, any transaction smaller than $50 was removed from our sample.  
                                                            
4 In their formulation of the price reference formation, Mayhew and Winer (1992) use only the most recent price, 
which is equivalent to setting 𝜃𝜃 = 0 in our context. 




The second measure relating to transacted prices is the Gini coefficient of prices. The Gini coefficient 
measures the degree of dispersion, and its values range between 0 and 1, with the former representing a 
market where all passengers paid the same fare and a value of 1 indicates the highest degree of inequality. 









where 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚 is the Gini measure of market m; yi is ith least expensive itinerary documented on DB1B for 
travel on the route during the quarter; and n is the number of itineraries (i.e., the market enplanements) 
documented on the route on DB1B during the quarter. Since the Gini coefficient is bounded between 0 and 
1, we estimate the Gini log-odds ratio which is given by 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚 = 𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺 �
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
1−𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚
�, a measure that is 
unbounded. 
Beyond transacted fares, we also study the relationship between price volatility and sales volume.  
For each market we compute the FillRate, which is the ratio between the total number of passengers who 
traveled on a route during the quarter to the total number of seats that where available in this market. The 
fill rate for each market was calculated using the T-100 database of the Department of Transportation by 
aggregating the seating capacity and enplanement during the quarter.  
The final variable of interest is the total generated revenue in each market. Using the above measures, 
we generate a new normalized revenue measure variable RevenueRate. We define this measure as the 
product of the market’s fill rate and the market’s average normalized transacted fare on the route. Formally, 
we have RevenueRate  =   AveragePaidFareKM · FillRate. 
4.3 Explanatory Variables 
The variables affecting airfare can be classified into two broad groups: route characteristics and market 
structure.  




We first describe our route characteristics variables. In line with the method used by Gerardi and 
Shapiro (2009), we collected data on the great circle distance for each airport pair (Distance), the population 
of each airport’s metropolitan area size, as well as the income of the metropolitan area from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Using the data from the BEA we further 
derived the income per capita of the population within the metropolitan area. Consistent with the literature, 
we have accounted for the average population (AvgPop) served by both origin and destination airports, as 
well as the average income per capita (AvgIncPop) of the corresponding origin and destination metropolitan 
areas. To control for the airlines’ long term decisions about seat supply in the market, we also generate a 
measure of the total seating capacity in a market, MarketSeats.  
We also adopt Gerardi and Shapiro’s (2009) categorization of markets as leisure and/or business 
markets. Leisure markets are as markets with mainly price sensitive leisure passengers. Leisure is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when either of the airports in the market is classified as a leisure destination, which 
occurs if the ratio of the accommodation earnings to the total nonfarm earnings corresponding to the 
metropolitan area where this airport is located exceeds 0.85. Business is a dummy variable and such markets 
are termed by Geradi and Shapiro (2009) as big-city routes. If both origin and destination airports belong 
to the largest 30 metropolitan areas, then the market is defined as a business market (i.e., our Business 
variable is assigned a value of 1).  
Market structure variables capture the competitive pressure in each market. We make use of two 
popular measures: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the competitive index that quantifies the 
degree of market concentration, and the presence of low cost carriers (LCC). The HHI is defined as the 
squared market shares of carriers on a route, where the market share is calculated using MarketSeats 
variable, and the distribution of available seats between carriers. Thus, a value of 1 corresponds to a 
monopoly setting whereas a value of 0 reflects perfect competition. The competitive pressure measured by 
the HHI has been shown to induce lower airfares (e.g., Borenstein and Rose, 1994, and Dana, 1999). Low 
cost carriers (LCCs) impose a unique competitive pressure on airfares (Goolsbee and Syverson, 2005). 
LCCs possess a different operational mode than the traditional full service carriers. Specifically, LCCs have 




leaner operations that are facilitated by point-to-point service, they offer a single fare class, and operate a 
single airplane type. Accordingly, the airfare transacted by LCCs is significantly lower than the fare 
transacted by full service carriers. To account for the pressure stemming from LCCs, we measure the market 
share of LCCs on each airport pair based on the share of the total number of passenger enplanements by 
LCCs. The list of LCCs include AirTran Airways, Allegiant Air, JetBlue Airways, Southwest Airlines, 
Spirit Airlines, Sun Country Airlines, USA3000 Airlines, Virgin America, and Frontier. 
We also control for the airport sizes by accounting for the number of passengers they served. This 
measure of airport activity could stem from locational rents of the airport (i.e., higher if located near a large 
metropolitan area), or from serving as a hub for certain carriers. Such an attribute can effect pricing, as, for 
example, an airport may charge carriers and passengers a premium if it has a high level of activity. We use 
the average number of passengers at both origin and destination airports (AvgAirportPAX). To derive this 
measure, we have used airport enplanement data from the FAA’s website. We also consider an 
alternative measure that accounts for the presence of an airline’s hub in a market. Specifically, we 
include dummy variables  for each airline, 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖, each takes a value of 1 if either the origin or the 
destination airport of market m is a hub of Airline i, 𝐺𝐺 ∈ {Airtran, Alaska, American, Continental, Delta, 
Frontier, Jet Blue, Midwest, Northwest, Southwest, Spirit, Sun Country, United, US, and Virgin}, and 0 
otherwise.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of these variables in our sample. The number of route 
observations in our sample is of 823 airport pairs, with an average transacted fare of 19 cents per Kilometer. 
The average stage length of the sampled routes is of about 1132 km, and these routes have about 80,000 
market seats on average, with considerable variation between routes. The table also shows that the average 
population of the metropolitan areas sampled is of approximately 2.5 million people and the average per 
capita income in our sample is of about US $25,800.  It is also evident that the share of LCCs and the 
competition index HHI, vary considerably between markets with a standard deviation of 0.318 and 0.257, 




respectively. Finally, our volatility measure shows that the average price change on a route is approximately 
1.2%, and the highest fare volatility on a route in our sample is of approximately 12%.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Distance (1000 km) 823 1.132 0.633 0.109 2.724 
HHI (seats) 823 0.643 0.257 0.193 1.000 
LCCshare  823 0.230 0.318 0.000 1.000 
Market Seats (m) 823 0.080 0.072 0.000 0.500 
AvgPop (m) 823 2.525 2.394 0.220 9.529 
AvgIncPop (K$) 823 2.581 2.486 0.191 9.531 
AvgAirportPax (m) 823 15.002 6.121 3.332 39.879 
PVOLN90  823 0.012 0.010 0.001 0.120 
Business 823 0.382 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Leisure 823 0.139 0.346 0.000 1.000 
AveragePaidFareKM ($) 823 0.188 0.143 0.063 1.651 
GiniLogOdds 823 -1.055 .280 -2.033 -0.118 
FillRate 823 0.762 0.097 0.337 1.000 
RevenueRate (RASK) 823 0.166 0.095 0.040 1.338 
 
 
5 What information can be learned from price volatility? 
In this section, we empirically explore the degree to which price volatility embeds information about market 
performance measures, beyond the information embedded in commonly used variables. To that end, we 
estimate the following linear reduced-form equations:  
𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 = α0 + α1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃90𝑚𝑚 + α2𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑚𝑚 + α3𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 + α4𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 + α5𝐾𝐾𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚 +
α6𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 + α7𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 + α8𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚 + α9𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 + α10𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚 +
α11𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚, 
(1) 
 
where PredVarm is the predicted variable in market m, which is one of the following: AveragePaidFareKM, 
GiniLogOdds, FillRate, or RevenueRate. Hence, for each predicted variable, we carry out several 
estimations based on equation (1). AirportHub is either AvgBoarding or the series of HubAirline dummy 
variables. In §5.1 we look at implications of price volatility on transacted prices.  In §5.2 we focus on the 




volume of sales and generated revenue and accordingly the predicted variables are FillRate, and 
RevenueRate, respectively.  
5.1 Price Volatility and Transacted Fares 
We start by analyzing whether the daily volatility of posted prices embeds unique information about the 
average fare paid by consumers. Table 2 presents the regression results for different specifications where 
the dependent variable is the fare paid for each kilometer traveled. In specification 1, Airport activity is 
controlled for by including the HubAirline dummies, whereas in specification 2, AvgBoarding is included 
instead.  
Before discussing the coefficients of the price volatility measures, we note that traditional 
explanatory variables behave as expected. Namely in Estimation 1, the transacted price per km (FareKM) 
decreases with the length of the flight (Distance) as with longer flights airlines can fly longer portion at 
cheaper cruising speeds and can use larger and more efficient aircrafts; it decreases in the proportion of 
seats offered by LCCs (LCC share) since those carriers have a leaner operational mode. The transacted 
price also decreases with the supply of seats in the market (MarketSeats); and it decreases in the ‘hubness’ 
of the airport (AvgBoard); and increases with the income levels (AvgIncPop) and when the market is 
classified as a business route. Interestingly, HHI, AvgPop and Leisure do not emerge as significant variables 
in predicting the average levels of transacted fares. Possibly, they provide no additional information after 
controlling for the other variables. 
From the first two columns of Table 2, it is evident that volatility is positively correlated with the 
average transacted prices. Specifically, these regressions reveal that an increase of one percentage point in 
the volatility of the posted airfares is associated with an increase of $1.58 - $1.77 per 100 km. Thus, 
volatility embeds information about market performance with respect to relative price levels per Kilometer. 
Many reasons may lead to this, perhaps volatility is the outcome of the higher margins estimated, as 
increased competition for those markets yields more price changes. Another possibility is that, consistent 
with marketing literature, it may be that as price volatility increases, consumers become less sensitive to 
price, which ultimately results with higher paid prices. Regardless of the reasons, these results suggest a 




new metric that can help managers, practitioners and passengers learn about the performance in different 
markets.   
Table 2. Average Transacted FareKM and Gini of Transacted Fares 
 
 
To further learn about the information embedded in volatility of posted airfares, we now consider the 
dispersion of the transacted airfares as captured via the Gini coefficient. Similar to Gerardi and Shapiro 
(2009) we transform the Gini coefficient (which is bounded between zero and one) to the unbounded 
statistic Gini log-odds ratio. The results of the estimations are provided in the last two columns of Table 2. 
These results clearly reveal the significant relationship between the volatility of posted airfares and the 
 FareKM GiniLogOdds 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
PVOLN90 1.771** 1.585** 5.578** 5.570** 
 (0.395) (0.406) (0.739) (0.759) 
Distance (k) -0.129** -0.152** 0.0697** 0.101** 
 (0.00779) (0.00817) (0.0146) (0.0153) 
HHI seats -0.00214 0.0279 0.0437 0.0221 
 (0.0173) (0.0177) (0.0324) (0.0330) 
LCC share -0.0688** -0.0785** -0.369** -0.368** 
 (0.0136) (0.0146) (0.0254) (0.0273) 
MarketSeats (m) -0.0428 -0.169* 0.428** 0.639** 
 (0.0789) (0.0708) (0.147) (0.132) 
AvgPop (m) 0.00273 0.000980 0.0157** 0.0172** 
 (0.00175) (0.00190) (0.00327) (0.00355) 
AvgIncPop (k) 0.00324+ 0.00171 0.0140** 0.0146** 
 (0.00171) (0.00185) (0.00320) (0.00347) 
Business 0.0232* 0.0256** 0.0428* 0.0501** 
 (0.00919) (0.00969) (0.0172) (0.0181) 
Leisure 0.0140 0.00609 -0.0568* -0.0972** 
 (0.0128) (0.0138) (0.0239) (0.0259) 
AvgBoard (m) -0.00194* - 0.00373*  
 (0.000955)  (0.00179)  
HubAirline Dummies - YES  YES 
Constant 0.337** 0.332** -1.316** -1.313** 
 (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0343) (0.0339) 
N 823 822 823 822 
adj. R2 0.382 0.426 0.438 0.477 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 




dispersion of the transacted airfares. Intuitively, price volatility increases the range of different prices that 
are available to consumers, and with a greater range of available prices, one expects to encounter a wider 
dispersion of fares transacted by consumers.   
Thus far, we have found that price volatility levels can embody information about transacted prices 
both in terms of level and dispersion: the more volatile prices are, the higher is the average transacted prices 
and the greater is their dispersion. In the presence of volatile prices, as consumers appear to pay more for 
their itineraries, does one expect the law of demand to prevail (that is, higher prices come with lower 
demand), or is price volatility associated with consumers paying more with no (or limited) other 
consequences? We address this question in the next subsection by exploring the relationship between price 
volatility and fill rates. 
5.2 Information about Fill Rates and Revenue 
We now turn to examine the relationship between price volatility and the volume of sales. The supply of 
seats in each market is a long term decision made by airlines. The most obvious mechanism used by airlines 
to increase their fill rates is pricing. Lower prices are expected to increase demand and vice versa. Indeed, 
one of the goals of RM systems is to minimize the quantity of unsold goods. Specifically, they seek to 
increase the load factor of their flights, as this is one of the major performance metrics in the airline industry.  
Our estimation results, where the dependent variable is the fill rate, are provided in the first two 
columns of Table 3. The results suggest that an increase of one percentage point in the volatility of the 
posted airfares is associated with a decrease of 1.29 - 1.51 percentage points in the fill rate. This is an 
interesting result: higher price volatility levels indicate a lower sales volume. One percentage point decrease 
in the fill rate could impact an airline quite dramatically. This result could be expected considering that 
price volatility may reflect the level to which market demand is predictable.  
Hence, higher price volatility is associated with higher transacted airfare, but lower fill rates.  These 
two results have contradicting effects on revenue. Do airlines gain superior revenues in markets exhibiting 
higher level of price volatility? That is, do the associated higher transacted airfares compensate for the 
associated lower demand or vice versa? This question is addressed in the last two estimations in Table 3, 




which reveal that in markets with higher volatility levels, airlines yield higher revenues when compared to 
markets with lower volatility levels. Specifically, we find that for one percentage point increase in the 
volatility of prices, airlines experience an increase in revenue of $1.13-1.27 per available seat kilometer.  
Table 3. Fill Rate and Revenue Rate 
 FillRate RevenueRate 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
PVOLN90 -1.509** -1.287** 1.274** 1.131** 
 (0.270) (0.264) (0.249) (0.257) 
Distance (k) 0.0535** 0.0755** -0.0945** -0.101** 
 (0.00532) (0.00532) (0.00491) (0.00517) 
HHI seats 0.0441** 0.0405** 0.0153 0.0315** 
 (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0109) (0.0112) 
LCC share -0.00980 -0.00679 -0.0583** -0.0657** 
 (0.00930) (0.00951) (0.00859) (0.00925) 
MarketSeats (m) 0.0303 0.231** -0.0537 -0.0537 
 (0.0539) (0.0462) (0.0498) (0.0449) 
AvgPop (m) -0.00803** -0.00660** 0.00148 0.000404 
 (0.00119) (0.00124) (0.00110) (0.00120) 
AvgIncPop (k) -0.00769** -0.00673** 0.000976 -0.000102 
 (0.00117) (0.00121) (0.00108) (0.00117) 
Business -0.0479** -0.0473** 0.00577 0.00818 
 (0.00628) (0.00631) (0.00580) (0.00614) 
Leisure 0.00341 0.00314 0.00466 0.000628 
 (0.00874) (0.00902) (0.00807) (0.00877) 
AvgBoard (m) 0.00646** - 0.000904 - 
 (0.000653)  (0.000603)  
HubAirline Dummies - Yes  Yes 
Constant 0.651** 0.647** 0.244** 0.247** 
 (0.0125) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0115) 
N 823 822 823 822 
adj. R2 0.374 0.472 0.448 0.483 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
6 Price Volatility and Consumer Behavior 
The analysis thus far has confirmed that price volatility levels embed information about market outcomes, 
beyond what is derived from conventional market variables. In this section, we seek evidence to whether 




the effect of price volatility on consumer behavior, which was documented in the context of staple goods, 
exists in the context of revenue managed goods as well. Namely, we test for evidence that with higher 
volatility, price sensitivity of consumers is reduced and greater revenue can be generated. The results of 
Section 5.1 can support the same logic that was found in the marketing literature with respect to staple 
goods, also for the context of revenue managed goods. That is, although consumers may be expecting the 
variations in prices of flights over time, the fact that prices are changing may lead consumers to be willing 
to pay a higher price, on average, for a flight. In this section we seek to provide evidence whether this 
phenomenon may indeed exist in the context of airline tickets, and more broadly of revenue managed goods.  
For this purpose, we develop a two-stage model where price volatility and average posted price per 
Kilometer are endogenously estimated in the first stage, and revenue is estimated in the second stage. The 
average posted price per Kilometer is calculated using our 5 fare histories (h), each containing 90 days of 







The reason for endogenizing the average posted price has to do with our instrument variables. With the 
estimation of the average posted price in the first stage, the market variables are not expected to affect the 
transacted prices in the second stage. In other words, since the average posted price captures the entire 
effect of market variables on pricing, market variables should not affect revenue beyond their influence on 
the posted fare. This allows for the utilization of distance and LCCShare as instrument variables in the first 
stage. Accordingly, in the first stage we estimate the following two models: 
AvgPostedPriceKM 𝑚𝑚 = α0 + α1Distance𝑚𝑚 + α2AvgPop𝑚𝑚 + α3AvgIncPop𝑚𝑚 +




PVOLN90𝑚𝑚 = α0 + α1Distance𝑚𝑚 + α2AvgPop𝑚𝑚 + α3AvgIncPop𝑚𝑚 +
α4HHISeats𝑚𝑚+ α5AvgBoard𝑚𝑚 + α6MarketSeats𝑚𝑚 + α7LCCShare𝑚𝑚 + ε𝑚𝑚. 
(3) 
And in the second stage we model the revenue at the route level as follows: 




RevenueRate𝑚𝑚 = β0 + β1FittedPVOLN90𝑚𝑚 + β2FittedAvgPostedPriceKM𝑚𝑚 +
β3AvgPop𝑚𝑚 + β4AvgIncPop𝑚𝑚+β5HHISeats𝑚𝑚 + β6AvgBoard𝑚𝑚 + β7MarketSeats𝑚𝑚 +




where 𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃90 and FittedAvgPostedPriceKM are the fitted values of PVOLN90 and 
AvgPostedPriceKM from the first stage of the model.  
We have estimated this model separately for business markets and for leisure markets, expecting 
volatility to affect consumer behavior of price sensitive consumers, and thus to be significant only in leisure 
markets. Indeed, our estimations showed insignificant effects of volatility on revenue in business markets. 
However, in the estimation of leisure markets the effect of volatility was found significant, supporting the 
notion that consumers become less price sensitive with increased volatility and therefore the market 
becomes more profitable.  
The first stage estimation results for leisure markets are provided in Table 4. From the table one can 
see that price volatility is significantly and negatively related to the presence of low cost carriers in the 
market, as well as to the average income per capita. With respect to AveragePostedFareKM, one can 
observe that the relationships with the independent variables hold as expected. The larger the distance the 
smaller the amount paid per kilometer traveled; and the downward pressure on prices is evident from the 
significantly negative coefficient of the LCC variable. 
 
  




Table 4. First stage estimations 
 Avg Posted Fare KM  Price Volatility 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Distance (k) -0.184** -0.193**  -0.0018+ 0.0015 
 (0.0148) (0.02)  (0.0009) (0.002) 
HHI seats 0.0766* 0.072+  -0.0035 -0.0047+ 
 (0.0374) (0.04)  (0.002) (0.003) 
LCC share -0.0584* -0.08**  -0.0056** -0.005* 
 (0.0237) (0.03)  (0.0015) (0.002) 
MarketSeats (m) 0.130 0.113  -0.0126 -0.008 
 (0.124) (0.16)  (0.008) (0.11) 
AvgPop (m) 0.0005 -0.005  -0.0001 -0.0003 
 (0.0046) (0.005)  (0.0002) (0.0003) 
AvgIncPop (k) 0. 002 0. 004  0. 0006* 0.00004 
 (0.004) (0. 005)  (0. 0003) (0.00003) 
AvgBoard (m) 0.0021   -0.00023  
 (0.0022)   (0.00014)  
HubAirline Dummies  YES   YES 
Constant 0.4246** 0.4643**  0.0160** 0.018** 
 (0.0419) 0.0478  (0.002) (0.003) 
N 114 114  114 114 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
The results of our second stage analysis are reported in Table 5. As can be seen, the variables 
estimated in the first stage are highly significant in the second stage. Most importantly, after endogenously 
modelling the posted price and controlling for it, volatility is positive and significant at the 1% level in its 
effect on the generated revenue.  These results are in line with the idea that consumers’ reaction to price 
changes in revenue managed goods, is similar in fashion to their behavioral reaction to changes in prices of 
staple goods, and that they become less price sensitive, allowing carriers to generate more revenue.  
  
  




Table 5. Second stage estimations 
 RevenueRate 
 (1) (2) 
Fitted PVOLN90 6.472** 9.64** 
 (2.429) (4.87) 
Fitted Avg Posted Fare KM 0.448** 0.422** 
 (0.05) (0.088) 
HHI seats 0.057** 0.084 
 (0.022) (0.038) 
MarketSeats (m) 0.0877 0.102 
 (0.0765) (0.13) 
AvgPop (m) 0.000007 0.00025 
 (0.0022) (0.0036) 
AvgIncPop (k) 0. 0005 0.0006 
 (0. 0002) (0.0004) 
AvgBoard (m) -0.0010  
 (0.0012)  
HubAirline Dummies  YES 
Constant -0.06* 0.124+ 
 (0.027) (0.067) 
N 114 114 
Centered R2 0.72 0.54 
Uncentered R2 0.93 0.88 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
7 Concluding remarks 
Revenue management is a tool commonly used by firms in numerous industries to boost the revenue 
generated from their stock of goods. The application of this tool results with prices that may fluctuate over 
time. The fact that different markets exhibit different volatility levels, allows us to investigate whether the 
different outcomes of RM practices embed market level information.  In this paper we have explored the 
relationship between the volatility of posted prices of revenue managed good and performance measures 
such as transacted prices and their dispersion, the sales levels, as well as the revenue generated. 




Our results complement the insights from the existing literature regarding market variables and 
performance, while providing additional understanding about fluctuating prices and the information they 
embed about market performance.  
Our results show that volatility levels reflect much about the interaction between sellers and their 
consumers in numerous ways. In particular, we showed that volatile prices are associated with higher 
transacted prices and increased distribution of these prices (as captured by the Gini coefficient). 
Furthermore, we found that increased volatility is associated with lower sales levels (as captured by the fill-
rates of the aircrafts). This reveals that while the revenue per unit sold increases, the volume of sales 
decreases. This initiated the exploration of the revenue generated, which, as captured by the RASK measure, 
suggests that it is higher with increased fare volatility levels. These results can help managers, practitioners, 
consumers and academics. Managers and practitioners can use the results presented in this paper to learn 
about potential markets to invest in, and the associated performance outcomes that may come as a result of 
such investments. This may also help managers quickly learn about where RM is most effective and where 
RM practices can be improved, simply by examining the volatility level of a market. This research also 
suggests that passengers may use volatility measures to help them behave more strategically. That is, based 
on this research, a passenger may learn that when a few options exist for traveling, it is better to travel on 
a less volatile route, as the average payed price per kilometer flown would be lower. For academics this 
research may provide a starting point for further analysis on the relationship between performance and 
volatility, and understanding the empirical implications of using RM systems.   
We have also provided deeper insights into linkage between volatility and consumer behavior, by 
examining whether there is evidence supporting the notion that the behavior of price sensitive consumers 
may be effected by volatility levels. Using a two-stage estimation model, we found support for the effect 
of volatility levels on consumers’ price sensitivity. The link between fluctuating prices and consumer 
behavior has been studied heavily in the context of perishable goods, our initial results, relating to possible 
consequences in the context of revenue-managed goods, can serve as a starting point for more research in 
this direction 




Many other directions for future research can be suggested based on this work. While our analysis 
was carried out in the context of US domestic aviation, it remains to explore whether the insights gravitate 
to international travel, where the planning process at the consumer end may start much earlier than with 
domestic travel. Further, other types of revenue-managed goods can be explored, such as sales of 
commercial slots, which expand the scope of interaction to inter-firm rather than firm-consumers.  
Appendix: Alternative approach to measuring volatility 
In this appendix we show the robustness of our findings, when discarding predictable price changes induced 
by the temporal proximity of departure date. In aviation markets, it can be argued that the price tends to 
exhibit a somewhat predictable pattern of a fare increase as departure date approaches. Therefore, in this 
section we model price volatility in airline markets using an approach which addresses this concern. For 
each of the markets we fit a commonly observed fare history and capture the dynamic deviations from this 
fitted line to derive a modified price volatility measure.  
Specifically, we adopt the pricing mechanism from Malighetti et al. (2009): 





where 𝜇𝜇 indicates the minimal price level, and where 𝛼𝛼,  𝛽𝛽 and 𝛾𝛾 control for the shape of the curve. 
Note that 𝛼𝛼 reflects the level of prices towards the departure date, with lower 𝛼𝛼 corresponding to 
a higher last minute fare, 𝛽𝛽 adjusts the speed of increase in fare, whereas 𝛾𝛾 change the curvature. 
This pricing formulation is powerful in its ability to capture last-minute price drops (for example 
as in the DCA-MDW market). 
Using the five fare histories, we fit the nonlinear function (5) by method of least squares to obtain 
the estimates for each of the markets. In the estimation process, we have eliminated three markets for which 
the projected fares explode. The resulting estimates are illustrated in Figure 3, noting the difference between 
the highly predictable DCA-MDW market and the highly volatile CVG-LGA.  
 





Figure 3. Different fare histories and the best line fit: CVG-LGA (left panel) and DCA-MDW (right 
panel) 
Next, we normalize the fare history by further accounting for the deviations from the predicted fare. 
Specifically, we divide each observed fare by the predicted fare, and resorting to our earlier method, we 
have: 





, with 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚90 = 0, 
where 𝑃𝑃�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 denotes  the fitted fare in market m. For example, in the highly predictable DCA-MDW market, 
the resulting NewPVOLN is 0.01174 (whereas PVOLN=0.02064). By contrast, in the highly volatile CVG-
LGA the NewPVOLN is only 0.03015 (compared with PVOLN of 0.02972). 
The estimation results, which are provided in Table 6, clearly indicate the robustness of our earlier 
insights, where price volatility is associated with increased transacted fares as well as increased transacted 

















































Table 6. Estimations with NewPVOLN 
 FareKM GiniLogOdds FillRate RevenueRate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NewPVOLN90 0.859** 4.048** -1.184** 0.626** 
 (0.309) (0.576) (0.209) (0.195) 
KM (k) -0.132** 0.0658** 0.0545** -0.0969** 
 (0.00782) (0.0146) (0.00530) (0.00495) 
HHI seats -0.00104 0.0471 0.0429** 0.0160 
 (0.0175) (0.0326) (0.0118) (0.0111) 
LCC share -0.0713** -0.375** -0.00726 -0.0601** 
 (0.0137) (0.0256) (0.00930) (0.00869) 
MarketSeats (m) -0.0476 0.441** 0.0250 -0.0564 
 (0.0799) (0.149) (0.0541) (0.0505) 
AvgPop (m) 0.00246 0.0156** -0.00791** 0.00130 
 (0.00176) (0.00329) (0.00119) (0.00111) 
AvgIncPop (k) 0.00294+ 0.0133** -0.00754** 0.000756 
 (0.00172) (0.00321) (0.00117) (0.00109) 
Business 0.0255** 0.0516** -0.0506** 0.00737 
 (0.00931) (0.0174) (0.00631) (0.00589) 
Leisure 0.0138 -0.0527* 0.00124 0.00452 
 (0.0130) (0.0242) (0.00878) (0.00820) 
AvgBoard (m) -0.00172+ 0.00340+ 0.00661** 0.00105+ 
 (0.000974) (0.00182) (0.000660) (0.000616) 
Constant 0.351** -1.287** 0.643** 0.253** 
 (0.0181) (0.0338) (0.0123) (0.0115) 
N 820 820 820 820 
adj. R2 0.373 0.433 0.375 0.437 
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